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I. INTRODUCTION
The Fourth Amendment undoubtedly prohibits the government from
breaking down doors on a mere hunch that the people inside are engaged in
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illegal activity.' It even prohibits the government from breaking down doors in
the good-faith but mistaken belief that doing so does not violate the law.2 But
less clear is what the Fourth Amendment requires when the government's
violation of these prohibitions turns up evidence against the suspect. 3 May the
government use this evidence despite its unconstitutional provenance?
Although the Fourth Amendment restricts the state to reasonable searches
and seizures, it does not say whether the state may use evidence acquired
through unreasonable searches. 4 Over the years, the Supreme Court has
struggled to determine what to do with illegally obtained evidence. In its early
cases, the Court developed what came to be called the exclusionary rule:
evidence obtained by illegal searches generally may not enter the courtroom. 5
The Court understood the rule as a corollary to the Fourth Amendment.6 What
would be the point of outlawing unreasonable searches, the Court reasoned, if
the fruits of those searches could still secure convictions?7 And presumably the
courts should not participate in an activity that smacks of condoning police
illegality.8 In the latter half of the twentieth century, however, the Court began
* J.D. Candidate, May 2014, The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law.
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1 Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 576 (1980) (citations omitted) ("[T]he Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution, made applicable to the States by the
Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits the police from making a warrantless and nonconsensual
entry into a suspect's home in order to make a routine felony arrest.").
2 United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 905 (1984) (accepting lower court's holding
that police lacked probable cause to conduct a search while finding that they acted in good-
faith belief that a warrant authorized the search).
3 See, e.g., Matthew Allan Josephson, To Exclude or Not To Exclude: The Future of
the Exclusionary Rule After Herring v. United States, 43 CREIGHTON L. REv. 175, 203
(2009) ("[T]he contours of the exclusionary rule are not exactly clear. . . .").
4 See U.S. CONsT. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.").
5 See, e.g., Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 462 (1928) (describing the
"striking outcome" of evidence being excluded in Weeks); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S.
383, 398 (1914) (holding that letters taken from defendant's home during a warrantless
search could not be admitted at trial); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 638 (1886)
(holding the trial court's forced production of the defendants' private papers an unreasonable
search and seizure and excluding the evidence).
6 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 651 (1961) ("[T]he exclusionary rule is an essential
ingredient of the Fourth Amendment .
7 Weeks, 232 U.S. at 393 ("If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held
and used in evidence against a citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the Fourth
Amendment declaring his right to be secure against such searches and seizures is of no
value, and, so far as those thus placed are concerned, might as well be stricken from the
Constitution.").
8 See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 223 (1960) ("Even less should the federal
courts be accomplices in the willful disobedience of a Constitution they are sworn to
uphold.").
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reinterpreting the rule as judge-made doctrine intended merely to reinforce the
Fourth Amendment. 9 This development in effect de-constitutionalized the
exclusionary rule. Deterring police misconduct came exclusively to define the
scope of the rule and its application.' 0
In light of the new view of the exclusionary rule as a police deterrent rather
than a constitutional protection, the Court has developed the "good-faith"
exception. Under this exception, evidence that police officers acquire in good-
faith reliance on the current state of the law is admissible even if the law
subsequently changes. In a line of cases beginning with United States v. Leon,"
the Court has applied the exception-i.e., has admitted evidence that was
illegally acquired-when police relied on invalid warrants, 12 subsequently
overturned statutes,13 clerical database errors by judicial administrators,14
clerical database errors by police,15 and, most recently in Davis v. United
States,16 on subsequently overturned "binding judicial precedent."
In Davis, the majority left open the question of whether the good-faith
exception applies when no binding precedent existed at the time of the illegal
police action.17 Since the Davis decision, district courts have begun to split on
this question of how to apply the exception when police act in the face of
unsettled law.18 The split reflects a general uncertainty about the breadth of the
9 See, e.g., United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974) ("In sum, the rule is a
judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through
its deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved.").
10See, e.g., United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 454 (1976) ("If... the exclusionary
rule does not result in appreciable deterrence, then, clearly, its use in the instant situation is
unwarranted."); Elkins, 364 U.S. at 217 ("The rule is calculated to prevent, not to repair. Its
purpose is to deter-to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively
available way-by removing the incentive to disregard it.").
11 United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 (1984) (holding that a police officer's
objectively reasonable reliance on a facially invalid warrant should not result in exclusion of
evidence obtained through search pursuant to the warrant).
12Id
13llinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 356-57 (1987) (officer reasonably relied on
subsequently overturned statute authorizing warrantless administrative searches).
14Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1995) (officer reasonably relied on invalid
arrest warrant when court clerk's computer error failed to indicate the warrant had been
quashed).
15 Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 137-39, 144 (2009) (no exclusion when
police reasonably rely on an invalid warrant due to negligent recordkeeping by police in a
neighboring county).
16 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2428-29 (2011) (officers reasonably relied on binding judicial
precedent in conducting automobile search at the time of arrest).
171d. at 2435 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) ("This case does not present the markedly
different question whether the exclusionary rule applies when the law governing the
constitutionality of a particular search is unsettled.").
18 See United States v. Ford, No. 1:11-CR-42, 2012 WL 5366049, at *10 (E.D. Tenn.
Oct. 30, 2012) (recognizing emerging district court split).
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good-faith exception. 19 While one might construe the Davis holding narrowly
and conclude that the case changed little, the Court's rationale employs strong,
sweeping language that suggests a much broader application. 20 Accordingly,
one group of district courts has read Davis narrowly as extending the good-faith
exception only to officers acting in circuits with binding precedent. 21 Another
group of courts has extended the rationale of Davis to circuits without binding
precedent, allowing police to rely on nonbinding case law. 22
Many commentators on the Davis case have focused on the question of
whether the exclusionary rule continues to have relevance. 23 Those who worry
that Davis has effectively gutted the exclusionary rule focus on its broad
rationale rather than on its holding. 24 Less thoroughly explored is the way lower
courts are actually applying Davis and why. The Supreme Court's decision in
United States v. Jones25 in early 2012, which overturned several circuits'
precedents with respect to the use of GPS devices on automobiles,26 has
19 See id.; see also infra Part III.A-B.
20George M. Dery III, "This Bitter Pill": The Supreme Court's Distaste for the
Exclusionary Rule in Davis v. United States Makes Evidence Suppression Impossible To
Swallow, 23 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 1, 2 (2012) ("The rationale the Court advanced went
well beyond its holding .... ); see also Tracey Maclin & Jennifer Rader, No More Chipping
Away: The Roberts Court Uses an Axe To Take Out the Fourth Amendment Exclusionary
Rule, 81 Miss. L.J. 1183, 1190 (2012) (arguing that Davis does not merely "chip away" at
the exclusionary rule but rather demonstrates that "the opponents of the exclusionary rule
have won"); James J. Tomkovicz, Davis v. United States: The Exclusion Revolution
Continues, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 381, 395 (2011).
21 See United States v. Robinson, 903 F. Supp. 2d 766, 784 (E.D. Mo. 2012); United
States v. Ortiz, 878 F. Supp. 2d 515, 541 (E.D. Pa. 2012); United States v. Lujan, No.
2:11CR11-SA, 2012 WL 2861546, at *3 (N.D. Miss. July 11, 2012); United States v. Lee,
862 F. Supp. 2d 560, 571 (E.D. Ky. 2012); United States v. Katzin, No. 11-226, 2012 WL
1646894, at *9 (E.D. Pa. May 9, 2012).
22 See United States v. Batista, No. 5:12crl1, 2013 WL 782710, at *6 (W.D. Va. Feb.
28, 2013); United States v. Fisher, Nos. 2:10-cr-28, 2:10-cr-32, 2013 WL 214379, at *2
(W.D. Mich. Jan. 18, 2013); United States v. Guyton, No. 11-271, 2013 WL 55837, at *3
(E.D. La. Jan. 3, 2013); Ford, 2012 WL 5366049, at *11; United States v. Oladosu, 887 F.
Supp. 2d 437, 443 (D.R.I. 2012); United States v. Rose, 914 F. Supp. 2d 15, 22 (D. Mass.
2012); United States v. Lopez, 895 F. Supp. 2d 592, 605 (D. Del. 2012); United States v.
Baez, 878 F. Supp. 2d 288, 294 (D. Mass. 2012); United States v. Leon, 856 F. Supp. 2d
1188, 1194-95 (D. Haw. 2012).
23 See, e.g., Craig M. Bradley, Is the Exclusionary Rule Dead?, 102 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1, 2 (2012). In Professor Bradley's view, the exclusionary rule survives Davis
and can continue to provide sufficient protection from Fourth Amendment violations. See id
at 22-23. He urges exclusion in cases where police negligence leads to "substantial"
violations of privacy rights. Id. at 23; see also 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE
§ 1.3(h), at 146 (5th ed. 2012) (concluding that Davis "looks much like a recipe for total
abandonment of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule").
24 See supra note 23.
25 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).26 When the Supreme Court handed down its opinion in Jones, the FBI stopped
monitoring thousands of GPS devices it had already installed. Julia Angwin, FBI Turns Off
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provided an opportunity for lower courts to determine how-and whether-
Davis will apply to retroactively illegal searches made in the absence of clear
binding precedent. 27 A careful look at how these courts are applying Davis can
help shed light on the current status of the exclusionary rule in the lower courts.
After outlining the contours of the lower court debate, this Note argues that
courts should apply the good-faith exception only when the law clearly
establishes that a particular police action is constitutional. This method borrows
from and repurposes the "clearly established" standard from qualified immunity
doctrine. 28 Part II lays the foundation of the issue by tracing the historical
development of the exclusionary rule and the good-faith exception. Part III
presents a case study of the application of the good-faith exception in the cases
following the Supreme Court's development of the Fourth Amendment in
United States v. Jones. Lastly, Part IV argues that a "clearly established"
standard in these cases would best serve the purposes of the Fourth Amendment
and the exclusionary rule, and subsequently demonstrates the application of the
rule to some of the fact-scenarios of the post-Jones GPS cases.
II. EXCLUSION'S RISE AND FALL, AND THE ROLE OF GOOD FAITH
A defendant's motivation for raising a Fourth Amendment claim often
arises from the possibility of suppressing illegally obtained evidence. 29 This
Thousands of GPS Devices After Supreme Court Ruling, WALL ST. J. DIGITs BLOG (Feb. 25,
2012, 3:36 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2012/02/25/fbi-tums-off-thousands-of-gps-
devices-after-supreme-court-ruling/.
2 7 For differing views on how post-Jones courts should handle the exclusionary rule
issues that have arisen, see Caleb Mason, New Police Surveillance Technologies and the
Good-Faith Exception: Warrantless GPS Tracker Evidence After United States v. Jones, 13
NEV. L.J. 60, 64 (2012) (adopting the narrow view) and Kyle Robbins, Comment, Davis,
Jones, and the Good-Faith Exception: Why Reasonable Police Reliance on Persuasive
Appellant Precedent Precludes Application of the Exclusionary Rule, 82 MIss. L.J. 1175,
1196 (2013) (adopting the broad view and proposing a totality-of-the-circumstances test to
determine whether police reliance was reasonable).
28 The Supreme Court itself has recognized the similarities between the good-faith
exception and "good-faith" or qualified immunity. See Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 344
(1986). For an excellent discussion of the overlap between the two doctrines in Supreme
Court decisions, see generally Jennifer E. Laurin, Trawling for Herring: Lessons in
Doctrinal Borrowing and Convergence, 111 COLuM. L. REv. 670 (2011) (tracing the
Supreme Court's development of its exclusionary rule doctrine through borrowings from
qualified immunity doctrine). For qualified immunity, the Court's test asks whether officers
had "fair waming that their alleged treatment of [the defendant] was unconstitutional." Hope
v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002) (denying qualified immunity to prison guards who tied a
prisoner to a "hitching post" for seven hours in the sun without water or bathroom breaks).
29 See Orin S. Kerr, Good Faith, New Law, and the Scope of the Exclusionary Rule, 99
GEO. L.J. 1077, 1118 (2011) ("The exclusionary rule is critical because it provides the basic
building block for the development of Fourth Amendment law."); Charles Alan Wright,
Must the Criminal Go Free If the Constable Blunders?, 50 TEX. L. REV. 736, 738 (1972)
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makes the rule especially important to the enforcement of the constitutional
privacy protection. Although the exclusionary rule began as a fundamental part
of the protection, its role has waned considerably in the past several decades,
particularly with the Court's development of the good-faith exception.
A. The Exclusionary Rule as Constitutional Mandate
In recent years, the Supreme Court has repeatedly pointed out that the
Fourth Amendment contains no provision for excluding illegally obtained
evidence from criminal trials.30 But the Court did not always take the absence
of explicit constitutional language to mean that exclusion lacked constitutional
grounding.31 On the contrary, through much of the twentieth century the Court
conceived of the exclusionary rule as the remedial corollary to the Fourth
Amendment right.32 Part of the idea was that by denying police the ability to
use the evidentiary fruits of their investigative labors, the exclusionary rule
worked to deter police from future privacy invasions. 33 Until quite recently,
other rationales also supported the rule, such as the judiciary's concern that it
should not implicitly condone constitutional violations, as well as the public's
concern that the government should not benefit from its illegal behavior.34
("So far as anyone has been able to ascertain, there is no effective remedy for illegal
searches and seizures other than the Exclusionary Rule.").
3 0 E.g., Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2426 (2011) ("The Amendment says
nothing about suppressing evidence obtained in violation of this command. That rule-the
exclusionary rule-is a 'prudential' doctrine. . . ."); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897,
906 (1984) ("The Fourth Amendment contains no provision expressly precluding the use of
evidence obtained in violation of its commands .... ).
31 See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) ("[W]ithout the Weeks rule the
assurance against unreasonable federal searches and seizures would be 'a form of words,'
valueless and undeserving of mention in a perpetual charter of inestimable human
liberties .... ); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393 (1914) ("If letters and private
documents can thus be seized and held and used in evidence against a citizen accused of an
offense, the protection of the Fourth Amendment declaring his right to be secure against
such searches and seizures, is of no value, and, so far as those thus placed are concerned,
might as well be stricken from the Constitution.").
3 2 See, e.g., Whiteley v. Warden, Wyo. State Penitentiary, 401 U.S. 560, 568-69 (1971)
(applying exclusion as a matter of course after identifying a Fourth Amendment violation);
Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655 ("We hold that all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in
violation of the Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible in a state court.");
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 467 (1928) ("The Weeks Case announced an
exception to the common law rule by excluding all evidence in the procuring of which
government officials took part by methods forbidden by the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments.").
3 3 Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960).
3 4 See JOsHUA DRESSLER & ALAN C. MICHAELS, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE 351-52 (5th ed. 2010); LAFAVE, supra note 23, § 1.1(c), at 14; Robert M.
Bloom & David H. Fentin, "A More Majestic Conception": The Importance of Judicial
Integrity in Preserving the Exclusionary Rule, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 47, 52-54 (2010).
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Since the mid-1970s, however, deterrence has become the Court's sole rationale
for exclusion,35 and the result has been a profound weakening of the
exclusionary rule.36
B. Exclusion Meets Its Match: The Spread of the Good-Faith Exception
The new focus on deterrence gave rise to a utilitarian method for
determining whether the exclusionary rule should apply at all: a weighing of
costs and benefits. 37 Even before the advent of the balancing test, Judge
Cardozo memorably summarized the cost side of the scale: "The criminal is to
go free because the constable has blundered."38 In this view, the criminal is no
less culpable as a result of negligent or even intentionally illegal police
behavior, so the exclusionary rule imposes on society the cost of leaving
criminals unpunished. 39 Although the benefits of applying the exclusionary rule
might include judicial integrity and general fairness, the Court has chosen to
recognize only deterrence. 40 In the Court's current view, there can be no
exclusion without deterrence, and the deterrence benefits must outweigh the
costs of exclusion. 41
35 See, e.g., Leon, 468 U.S. at 906; United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347
(1974). A number of commentators have challenged the Court's view that the exclusionary
rule can in fact deter police from constitutional violations. E.g., Michael D. Cicchini, An
Economics Perspective on the Exclusionary Rule and Deterrence, 75 Mo. L. REv. 459, 464
(2010) (arguing on purely theoretical grounds that "the exclusionary rule does not, and
cannot, deter police misconduct"). But see LAFAVE, supra note 23, § 1.2(b), at 37
(describing the "soft" evidence supporting the rule's effectiveness at deterring Fourth
Amendment violations).
36 See Bloom & Fentin, supra note 34, at 59; David Gray, A Spectacular Non Sequitur:
The Supreme Court's Contemporary Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule Jurisprudence,
50 AM. CRiM. L. REv. 1, 2 (2013).
37 Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 489-91 (1976) (holding that the rationales for
applying the exclusionary rule on direct review do not support its extension to federal habeas
corpus review).
38 People v. Defore, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (N.Y. 1926).
39 Some have argued, however, that the rights conferred by the Fourth Amendment
impose the heavy costs, not the exclusionary rule itself. E.g., Potter Stewart, The Road to
Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, Development and Future of the Exclusionary Rule
in Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83 COLuM. L. REv. 1365, 1392 (1983) ("Much of the criticism
leveled at the exclusionary rule is misdirected; it is more properly directed at the fourth
amendment itself.").
40 Bloom & Fentin, supra note 34, at 53.
41 See United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 454 (1976) ("If. . . the exclusionary rule
does not result in appreciable deterrence, then, clearly, its use in the instant situation is
unwarranted.").
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The good-faith exception developed naturally from a cost-benefit theory
relying on deterrence. 42 It is one of a handful of exceptions the Court has
recognized to the general application of the exclusionary rule.43 The core
concept of the good-faith exception is that when police are doing their duty
within existing law, there is nothing for the exclusionary rule to deter.44
Explicitly rejecting the notion from earlier opinions that "the exclusionary rule
is a necessary corollary of the Fourth Amendment," 45 the Court in United States
v. Leon held that the exclusionary rule should not apply when an officer relies
on a facially valid warrant that turns out not to be supported by probable
cause.46 The Court's reasoning helped to clarify that it construes the deterrence
benefits of exclusion very narrowly. The relevant deterrence is of police
personnel only; the cost-benefit analysis does not take into account, for
example, the possibility that exclusion might deter a magistrate from
negligently issuing warrants. 47
In the decade following Leon, the Court expanded the good-faith exception
on similar principles. In Illinois v. Krull, the Court declined to apply the
exclusionary rule when it held that a police officer acted in good-faith reliance
on a state statute later found unconstitutional.48 The Court expanded Leon again
42 See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 913 (1984) ("[T]he balancing approach that
has evolved during the years of experience with the [exclusionary] rule provides strong
support for the [good-faith exception].").
43 See, e.g., Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 599 (2006) (exclusionary rule does not
apply to knock-and-announce violations); United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 279
(1978) (evidence sufficiently attenuated from illegality need not be excluded); Silverthorne
Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920) (no exclusion for illegally acquired
evidence also acquired through an independent, legal avenue).
44 See, e.g., Leon, 468 U.S. at 918-19 (stating that the exclusionary rule "cannot be
expected, and should not be applied, to deter objectively reasonable law enforcement
activity").
45 1d. at 905; see also Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981, 991 (1984) (decided
the same day as Leon and similarly holding that a judge's error in preparing a warrant does
not require exclusion when the police officer acts in good-faith reliance on the warrant).
4 6 Leon, 468 U.S. at 913. Leon has received a good deal of scholarly criticism. E.g.,
LAFAVE, supra note 23, § 1.3(b), at 71 ("The Leon result and reasoning is vulnerable on
several different levels and from several different perspectives.").4 7 Leon, 468 U.S. at 917. Why this should be so is not obvious. As the Supreme Court
of Connecticut noted in rejecting Leon under its own state constitution, "the exclusionary
rule, although primarily directed at police misconduct, is also appropriately directed at the
warrant issuing process." State v. Marsala, 579 A.2d 58, 66 (Conn. 1990). Connecticut is
one of a number of states that have explicitly rejected Leon. E.g., State v. Guzman, 842 P.2d
660, 671 (Idaho 1992) (rejecting Leon in interpreting Idaho's state constitutional search-and-
seizure provision); Gary v. State, 422 S.E.2d 426, 428 (Ga. 1992) (recognizing Georgia's
statutory rejection of Leon).
48 Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 360 (1987). With respect to police officers, the
deterrence benefits were lacking in precisely the same way as in Leon. Id. at 350. Like
judges and magistrates, legislators have no strong incentive to violate the Fourth
Amendment, nor are they likely to be deterred from passing unconstitutional statutes for fear
8 14 [Vol. 74:5
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in Arizona v. Evans, holding that the good-faith exception applies when a police
officer executes a quashed arrest warrant that appeared in the police database
due to a clerical error by a court clerk.49
C. Herring: A New Wrinkle in Good Faith
With its decision in Herring v. United States, the Court significantly
extended the good-faith exception beyond the holdings in Leon, Krull, and
Evans.50 Acting on a quashed arrest warrant that police in a neighboring county
had negligently left active in a police database, an officer arrested a suspect and
found contraband on him.51 Although police negligence caused the violation, a
fact that might distinguish the case from Arizona v. Evans, two factors
convinced the Court that the good-faith exception should still apply: first, the
error was negligent, not reckless or intentional, and second, the negligence was
"attenuated" from the Fourth Amendment violation.52
Although the Herring holding could be read narrowly-a holding limited to
administrative error, for example-the Court's language suggests a broader
application:
To trigger the exclusionary rule, police conduct must be sufficiently deliberate
that exclusion can meaningfully deter it, and sufficiently culpable that such
deterrence is worth the price paid by the justice system. As laid out in our
cases, the exclusionary rule serves to deter deliberate, reckless, or grossly
negligent conduct, or in some circumstances recurring or systemic
negligence. 53
that the exclusionary rule will bar evidence in cases in which police rely on those statutes.
Id. at 351-52.
49 Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1995). As in Leon, the fault lay with an
employee of the courts, not with law enforcement personnel, so the same rationale applied.
See id. at 14-15.
50 See Wayne R. LaFave, The Smell of Herring: A Critique of the Supreme Court's
Latest Assault on the Exclusionary Rule, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 757, 758, 787
(2009) (noting that "the stage has been set for a more broad-ranging assault on the
exclusionary rule"). But see Orin Kerr, Responding to Tom Goldstein on Herring, VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY (Jan. 14, 2009, 2:38 PM), http://volokh.com/posts/1231961926.shtml (calling
Herring "a narrow and interstitial decision").
51 Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 137 (2009).
52 1d. at 144. Notably, the Court accepted the Eleventh Circuit's finding that the
arresting officers had not been negligent. Id. at 138-39.
531d. at 144. Some commentators have argued that the breadth and vagueness of the
language in Herring has led to undesirable extensions in the lower courts. See Claire
Angelique Nolasco et al., What Herring Hath Wrought: An Analysis of Post-Herring Cases
in the Federal Courts, 38 AM. J. CRIM. L. 221, 252 (2011) (demonstrating that "federal
courts have applied the Herring good-faith exception to police searches and seizures that
involved facts substantially dissimilar from those in Herring").
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This language offered the strongest hint yet that the Court intended to
protect wide swaths of negligent police action through application of the good-
faith exception. How wide these swaths are remains unclear.54 The Court has
not defined "recurring or systemic negligence," though it suggested the
possibility in Herring that a sufficiently error-ridden police database might have
led to a different outcome.55 Nor has the Court conclusively established that
negligence must be recurring or systemic in order to lead to exclusion. The
Court's additional attention to the attenuated nature of the negligence in
Herring, committed as it was by police in a different county from the arresting
officers, suggests that negligence closer to the violation might also bar the
good-faith exception.
D. The Davis Decision: Does It Mean What It Says?
The most recent "good-faith" case, Davis v. United States, produced both an
unsurprising outcome as well as the Court's strongest anti-exclusionary rule
rationale.56 Although the facts of the case are simple, the legal issue requires
some background.
1. Searching on What Authority?: Factual and Procedural Background
In a 2007 traffic stop, police arrested Stella Owens, who was driving drunk,
and her passenger, Willie Davis, who offered police a false name.57 After
handcuffing Owens and Davis and placing them in patrol cars, the police
searched the car and found a handgun belonging to Davis, a weapon he could
not carry legally because he was a convicted felon.58 At trial the court denied
Davis's motion to suppress the weapon, citing Gonzalez,59 an Eleventh Circuit
case interpreting the Supreme Court's decision in New York v. Belton.60
54 See, e.g., Josephson, supra note 3, at 203 (concluding that "the contours of the
exclusionary rule are not exactly clear post-Herring"); LaFave, supra note 50, at 770
(calling Herring a "scary" decision because its rationale "far outruns the holding").
55 Herring, 555 U.S. at 146; see also Erin Murphy, Databases, Doctrine &
Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 803, 820 (2010) (reviewing
Supreme Court criminal procedure cases involving databases and concluding that the Court
has failed "to articulate a consistent vision of the constitutional significance" of police
databases).
56 Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419 (2011); see also Dery III, supra note 20, at 2
("While the Court's ultimate holding might seem unremarkable, its rationale was agitated
and alarming.").
57 Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2425.
5 8Id. at 2425-26.
5 9 United States v. Gonzalez, 71 F.3d 819, 827 (11th Cir. 1996).
60 New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 459-60 (1981). In Belton, the Supreme Court had
held that a police officer arresting four unrestrained occupants of a vehicle could search the
vehicle's interior. Id. at 460.
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In Gonzalez, the Eleventh Circuit interpreted Belton to authorize police to
search a vehicle when making a traffic arrest, even after the vehicle's occupants
are fully restrained. 61 Under Gonzalez-a precedent binding on the officers in
Davis at the time of the arrest-the officers who arrested Davis had reason to
believe they could lawfully search the vehicle. 62 However, in 2009, two years
after Davis's arrest, the Supreme Court abrogated Gonzalez when it decided
Arizona v. Gant.63 Applying Gant retrospectively to Davis's arrest, the Eleventh
Circuit held that police officers violated Davis's Fourth Amendment rights by
searching the vehicle while he and Owens were restrained. Despite the
violation, the court held that the good-faith exception should apply because the
arresting officers could have relied on the Gonzalez precedent. The gun was
admitted into evidence despite being obtained in violation of the Fourth
Amendment. 64
2. The Majority Decision
The Supreme Court had no trouble affirming and holding that "searches
conducted in objectively reasonable reliance on binding appellate precedent are
not subject to the exclusionary rule." 65 In one sense the decision seems
unsurprising, as it simply extends the principle of the Leon line of cases: to the
best of their knowledge, police officers following binding appellate precedent
are acting lawfully.66 What makes Davis notable is the breadth of its rationale
and its apparent confirmation that the Court in Herring meant what it said.67
Much of the Court's rationale in Davis sounds as though it is creating an
entirely new standard for applying the exclusionary rule. The Court first
61 Gonzalez, 71 F.3d at 822, 824-27.
62Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2426. In dissent, Justice Breyer noted that although the parties
agreed in Davis that Gonzalez constituted binding judicial precedent, "future litigants will be
less forthcoming" and courts will have to struggle with difficult questions of what precedent
is "binding." Id. at 2437 (Breyer, J., dissenting). The emerging lower court case law
certainly bears out this prediction. See, e.g., United States v. Debruhl, 38 A.3d 293, 302
(D.C. Cir. 2012) (on rehearing, rejecting its own pre-Davis decision to exclude evidence and
holding instead that binding appellate precedent justified police action).
63 556 U.S. 332 (2009). Gant limited Belton by allowing police to search a vehicle only
when the occupants were unrestrained and in reaching distance of the vehicle. Id. at 343.
64 United States v. Davis, 598 F.3d 1259, 1263-64 (11th Cir.), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct.
502 (2010), and aff'd, 131 S. Ct. 2419 (2011).
65 Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2423-24.
66 In this respect the officers in Davis resemble the officers in Leon who were executing
a warrant; the officers in Krull who were acting in accordance with state statutes; the officers
in Evans who were carrying out a warrant that was faulty because of a court's clerical error;
and even the officers in Herring who were carrying out a warrant that was faulty because of
a clerical error by police officers in another county. See supra Part II.B-C.
67 See Bradley, supra note 23, at 2-3 (Davis "made it seem unlikely that Herring might
be limited to its narrow holding"); Dery III, supra note 20, at 27 ("The Davis
Court . .. ironically, repeated and expanded on the 'broad dicta' in Herring to further
marginalize the exclusionary rule.").
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attempts to lay to rest any remaining notion from its prior cases that the rule is
"a self-executing mandate implicit in the Fourth Amendment." 68 Casting
exclusion as a "bitter pill" for society, the Court grants it a very limited role:
"The rule's sole purpose, we have repeatedly held, is to deter future Fourth
Amendment violations." 69 More significant, though, are the Court's statements
on weighing the benefits of deterrence:
The basic insight of the Leon line of cases is that the deterrence benefits of
exclusion "var[y] with the culpability of the law enforcement conduct" at issue.
When the police exhibit "deliberate," "reckless," or "grossly negligent"
disregard for Fourth Amendment rights, the deterrent value of exclusion is
strong and tends to outweigh the resulting costs. But when the police act with
an objectively "reasonable good-faith belief' that their conduct is lawful, or
when their conduct involves only simple, "isolated" negligence, the
'deterrence rationale loses much of its force,"' and exclusion cannot "pay its
way." 70
This is a surprisingly broad characterization of a line of cases featuring only
one example, Herring, of negligence by law enforcement. 71
3. Concurring and Dissenting Opinions
As the concurring and dissenting opinions in Davis recognized, the majority
opinion left questions unanswered about the scope of the exclusionary rule and
the good-faith exception. Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Ginsburg, dissented
on multiple grounds. First, granting the good-faith exception in Davis defeats
the purpose of the Court's retroactivity doctrine, 72 which in certain situations
applies new constitutional rules to pending cases. 73 While Davis can
6 8 Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2427; see supra Part II.A.
69 Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2426-27.70 1d. at 2427-28 (citations omitted). As Professor Bradley has pointed out, Davis does
not offer a single clear test for good faith in this passage. Bradley, supra note 23, at 9.
Objectively reasonable belief in the lawfulness of one's act implies a lack of negligence, but
the court suggests that some negligence-that which is "simple" and "isolated"-will also
receive good-faith protection. Id.
71 One commentator points out that "[a]lthough technically Davis's reaffirmation of the
culpability demand may also be dictum, it is dead serious dictum." Tomkovicz, supra note
20, at 395.
72 Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2437 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
7 3 See Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328 (1987) (holding that "a new rule for the
conduct of criminal prosecutions is to be applied retroactively to all cases, state or federal,
pending on direct review or not yet final"). In Justice Breyer's view, little can come of
recognizing a past constitutional violation if the victim of the violation cannot obtain a
remedy. Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2437 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also Orin S. Kerr, Fourth
Amendment Remedies and Development of the Law: A Comment on Camreta v. Greene and
Davis v. United States, 2011 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 237, 252-53; Kerr, supra note 29, at 1082
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retroactively challenge the search and establish its unconstitutionality, he is
denied the exclusionary remedy. Second, Breyer raised the practical problem of
asking police officers to perform legal analysis to determine what precisely
constitutes "binding" precedent. 74
In her concurring opinion, Justice Sotomayor sought to emphasize the
narrowness of the Davis ruling, arguing that the case relied on the existence of
binding precedent and did not determine "whether the exclusionary rule applies
when the law governing the constitutionality of a particular search is
unsettled."75 In such a case, where appellate precedent does not clearly
authorize a police activity, Sotomayor suggests that the application of the good-
faith exception must await further case development. 76 The major looming
questions are, first, whether the lower courts or the Supreme Court should take
charge of this development, and, second, what principles should guide the
courts in their decision making.
III. A CASE STUDY IN THE GOOD-FAITH EXCEPTION: UNITED STATES V.
JONES
In early 2012, the Supreme Court decided United States v. Jones,77 setting
the stage for lower courts to begin answering the questions posed by Breyer and
Sotomayor. In 2005, joint state and federal investigators acquired a warrant to
install a GPS tracking device on a Jeep driven by Antoine Jones, whom they
suspected of drug trafficking. 78 The investigators acted outside the scope of
their warrant, installing the device while it was parked in a public lot and
tracking the vehicle's movements for twenty-eight days.79 The Supreme Court
held that the installation of a GPS device is a search under the Fourth
Amendment.80
(arguing that the exclusionary rule plays a critical role in the development of Fourth
Amendment law).
74Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2437 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
75 Id. at 2435 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
76d. at 2436 ("[W]hether exclusion would result in appreciable deterrence in the
circumstances of this case is a different question from whether exclusion would appreciably
deter Fourth Amendment violations when the governing law is unsettled.").
77 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
78 Id. at 948.
79 Id. Because the Court decided the case on the basis of a trespass theory, id at 949, it
did not need to reach the question of whether a four-week period of monitoring violated
Jones's reasonable expectation of privacy. Id. at 953-54.
8 0 1d. at 954. The government argued that no warrant was required even if it was a
search, but the Court held that the government had forfeited this argument below. Id.
Although the Court's trespass theory for holding the GPS installation to be a search garnered
five votes, the four Justices concurring in the judgment found the rationale implausibly
outdated. See id. at 957 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment) (noting the oddity of applying
eighteenth-century tort law to twenty-first-century technology).
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In the wake of Jones, several criminal defendants have filed motions to
suppress evidence that was acquired through warrantless GPS surveillance
conducted prior to Jones.81 The facts of these cases tend to follow a common
pattern. In each case, police identify a suspect, usually someone believed to be
participating in ongoing criminal activity, such as a string of burglaries. 82
Without a warrant, police then attach a GPS device to the suspect's
automobile. 83 After a period of time, which may range from a few days to more
than a year, police rely on the GPS data to make an arrest.84 The defendant
seeks to suppress evidence acquired as a result of the monitoring, and while the
case is still pending, the Supreme Court hands down United States v. Jones,
rendering the warrantless GPS usage unconstitutional. The stage is set: the
defendant now has an apparently winning Fourth Amendment claim.8 s But does
he have a remedy? Will the court suppress the illegally obtained evidence?
In cases in which binding appellate precedent existed in the jurisdiction at
the time of the challenged search, lower courts have had little trouble applying
Davis to admit the evidence. 86 For example, before Jones, the Seventh, Eighth,
and Ninth Circuits had specifically authorized police officers to install GPS
devices on vehicles in at least some cases without a warrant.87 These pre-Jones
cases were binding circuit precedent at the time of the search, so challenges to
81 See supra notes 21-22.
82 United States v. Katzin, No. 11-226, 2012 WL 1646894, at *1 (E.D. Pa. May 9,
2012).
83 In Katzin, FBI agents attached a GPS device to the exterior of the defendant's Dodge
Caravan while it was parked on a Philadelphia street. Id. at *2.
84 The GPS surveillance in Katzin lasted just two days before connecting the defendants
with the burglary of a Rite-Aid pharmacy and leading to an arrest. Id. By contrast, the
monitoring in United States v. Baez lasted 347 days. United States v. Baez, 878 F. Supp. 2d
288, 292 (D. Mass. 2012). Because Jones did not base its holding on reasonable expectations
of privacy, the effect of the length of monitoring remains an open question. Jones, 132 S. Ct.
at 954 (explaining that "there is no reason for rushing forward to resolve" the difficult
questions of how GPS surveillance affects privacy expectations).85 See Katzin, 2012 WL 1646894, at *7.
86 District court cases finding binding appellate precedent in the Seventh and Ninth
Circuits include: United States v. Smith, No. 2:1 1-CR-00058-GMN, 2012 WL 4898652 (D.
Nev. Oct. 15, 2012); United States v. Nwobi, No. CR10-952(C) GHK-7, 2012 WL 769746,
at *3 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 2012). In the Eighth Circuit: United States v. Barraza-Maldonado,
879 F. Supp. 2d 1022, 1030 (D. Minn. 2012); United States v. Amaya, 853 F. Supp. 2d 818,
830 (N.D. Iowa 2012), partially withdrawn on other grounds, 853 F. Supp. 2d 835 (N.D.
Iowa 2012).
87 The Ninth and Seventh Circuits had held that installing and monitoring GPS devices
on vehicles did not constitute a Fourth Amendment search. United States v. Pineda-Moreno,
591 F.3d 1212, 1216-17 (9th Cir. 2010) (surveillance in public places is not a search);
United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 998 (7th Cir. 2007) (targeted GPS surveillance of a
suspect is not a search). The Eighth Circuit had held that it was a search but could be
justified by reasonable suspicion. United States v. Marquez, 605 F.3d 604, 609 (8th Cir.
2010). Only the D.C. Circuit had held that GPS tracking constituted a search and required a
warrant. United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 560 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
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GPS searches in these circuits have foundered on the good-faith exception. The
only real question arising in these binding-precedent cases is whether particular
precedents have facts similar enough to the challenged action to qualify as
"binding" under Davis.88 Fundamentally, though, cases in these circuits
represent straightforward applications of the Davis good-faith exception.
A more difficult question is how lower courts should apply the good-faith
exception when police officers lacked binding appellate precedent at the time of
the Fourth Amendment violation. Two general responses have emerged. On the
one hand are courts that read Davis narrowly on its facts.89 When police lack
binding appellate precedent, these courts argue, the exclusionary rule should
apply as usual. On the other hand, a number of courts have seized on the
Supreme Court's broad rationale, which suggests that lower courts should
exclude evidence only when police are highly culpable. 90 Even in the absence
of binding precedent, these courts hold, police actions may lack the culpability
necessary to require exclusion. An analysis of the decisions and rationales of
these lower courts can help to shed light on the current state of the exclusionary
rule and the good-faith exception. 91
A. The Narrow View: Restricting Davis to Binding Appellate Precedent
Courts adopting the narrow view of Davis have marshaled a number of
arguments in favor of restricting the case closely to its facts. These arguments
may be summarized as follows: (1) Davis repeatedly emphasizes the importance
of binding precedent, not just any precedent; 92 (2) the Leon line of good-faith
cases, including Davis, authorizes police action that relies on binding law, and
no case has authorized an officer's reliance on nonbinding law;93 (3) the cost-
benefit analysis required by the Supreme Court actually recommends limiting
police reliance to binding judicial precedent; 94 (4) allowing reliance on
nonbinding precedent threatens to freeze the development of Fourth
Amendment law;95 and (5) a bright-line binding-precedent rule provides clarity
88 Compare United States v. Andres, 703 F.3d 828 (5th Cir. 2013) (treating analogous
"beeper" case as binding precedent), and United States v. Rosas-Illescas, 872 F. Supp. 2d
1320 (N.D. Ala. 2012) (finding 1981 Fifth Circuit case on beepers to be binding precedent),
with United States v. Lujan, No. 2:11CRll-SA, 2012 WL 2861546, at *3 (N.D. Miss. July
11, 2012) (finding no Fifth Circuit case to be binding precedent for GPS installations).
89 See supra note 21.
90 See supra note 22.
91 Although Professor Mason has offered a valuable framework for analyzing these
post-Jones cases, Mason, supra note 27, at 73, the subsequent case law has shown that lower
courts have so far found the broad view more appealing than he anticipated. Id. at 79-80.
92 E.g., United States v. Ortiz, 878 F. Supp. 2d 515, 539-40 (E.D. Pa. 2012).
93 See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 862 F. Supp. 2d 560, 568-69 (E.D. Ky. 2012).
94 See Ortiz, 878 F. Supp. 2d at 542.
95 See United States v. Robinson, 903 F. Supp. 2d 766, 784 (E.D. Mo. 2012) (predicting
that extending Davis "would further undermine the Court's decisions on retroactive
application of a new rule").
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for law enforcement. 96 The courts have developed these arguments in a number
of ways.
The first defense of the narrow view of Davis relies on the restricting
language of the opinion. Several courts have argued that the Court in Davis
goes out of its way to emphasize that the existence of binding precedent is
critical to the holding. 97 For example, the Court refers more than a dozen times
to "binding" precedent, not to "persuasive" precedent or some broader
formulation. 98 Moreover, the Supreme Court says that the officers in Davis
acted "in strict compliance" with binding precedent,99 that they followed that
precedent "to the letter," 00 and that the precedent "specifically authorize[d] a
particular police practice."' 0 ' As one district court has noted,102 the majority
opinion in Davis even admits that "defendants in jurisdictions in which [a
Fourth Amendment] question remains open will still have an undiminished
incentive to litigate the issue"103 even after a number of circuit courts or state
supreme courts have ruled on it. If this is correct, and defendants will indeed
retain an incentive to litigate open issues, it must be because persuasive
authority cannot entirely determine the application of the good-faith exception
in other jurisdictions. Such narrowing language throughout the opinion has
convinced some district courts that Davis should not be read to extend the good-
faith exception to officers' reliance on nonbinding precedent.104
A second argument for the narrow view focuses on binding law as the
common element in the Leon line of good-faith cases.105 The district court in
United States v. Lee, for example, determined that "the good-faith exception
does not apply whenever police officers believe they are following the law,"
because good faith is a legal term of art meaning objectively reasonable.106 The
96 Lee, 862 F. Supp. 2d at 570.
97 Ortiz, 878 F. Supp. 2d at 540 ("The Supreme Court emphasized that the agents had
acted exactly in accordance with Gonzalez, the applicable circuit court case. . . ."); see also
Robinson, 903 F. Supp. 2d at 784 ("The language of Davis is narrow, and quite specific.").
98 Ortiz, 878 F. Supp. 2d at 539-40 (collecting references in Davis).
99 Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2428 (2011).
100 Id
101Id. at 2429. The district court in Ortiz relied on this language to argue that a
precedent must be directly on point to be binding. Ortiz, 878 F. Supp. 2d at 540-41. For this
reason, Ortiz rejected the Supreme Court's "beeper" cases-United States v. Karo, 468 U.S.
705, 713 (1984); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 285 (1983)-as binding precedent
for GPS installations. Ortiz, 878 F. Supp. 2d at 541. Those two cases did not address the
trespass theory the Supreme Court relied on in Jones, nor did they "specifically authorize"
the use of GPS technology when the technologies differ significantly. Id.
102 See Robinson, 903 F. Supp. 2d at 784.
103Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2433. Precisely because the use of nonbinding precedent
threatens to reduce this incentive, some district courts have objected to the broad view. See,
e.g., Robinson, 903 F. Supp. 2d at 784.104 Ortiz, 878 F. Supp. 2d at 540; accord Mason, supra note 27, at 69.
105 See supra Part II.B.
106 United States v. Lee, 862 F. Supp. 2d 560, 568 (E.D. Ky. 2012).
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best way to determine what that phrase means is to see how the Supreme Court
has applied it. 0 7 The rule the Lee court saw emerging from the Leon line of
cases, including Davis, is that police action is objectively reasonable "only
when an (ultimately incorrect) legal authority approved of the officers'
actions."108 This view of the good-faith exception obviates the need for an
analysis of officer culpability, for police action taken with legal authority is not
culpable and requires no deterrence.109 However, deterrence plays a very
different role when a police officer lacks clear legal authority. In such a case,
the officer "is guessing at what the law might be, rather than relying on what a
binding legal authority tells him it is." 10
Similarly, the district court in United States v. Ortiz chose to view some of
the broader Davis language as "dicta that must be read in context."II1 In Ortiz,
the government argued that Davis stands for the proposition that officers need
not rely on binding appellate precedent so long as their illegal behavior was not
deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent.11 2 According to the district court,
however, this language of culpability does not state a rule; rather, it explains
why strict compliance with binding appellate precedent deserves the application
of the good-faith exception. 113 In both Lee and Ortiz, then, the courts play down
the relevance of the broad rationale of Davis by focusing on the existence of
binding law in the form of judicial precedent.
A third argument for applying Davis narrowly appeals to the basic cost-
benefit analysis underlying the Supreme Court's current understanding of the
107 Id.
108Id.; see also Robinson, 903 F. Supp. 2d at 785 (holding an officer's reasonable but
erroneous belief that nonbinding precedent justifies her action falls outside the bounds of the
good-faith exception as defined by the Leon line); United States v. Katzin, No. 11-226, 2012
WL 1646894, at *9 (E.D. Pa. May 9, 2012) (declining to extend Davis to nonbinding
precedent because the Leon cases "generally involve reliance on unequivocally binding legal
authority").
109 Lee, 862 F. Supp. 2d at 568.
1101d. at 569. Lee does not go so far as to suggest that this guessing constitutes
negligence, but at least one other court has suggested as much. See Katzin, 2012 WL
1646894, at *9.
111 United States v. Ortiz, 878 F. Supp. 2d 515, 541 (E.D. Pa. 2012). Both Katzin and
Ortiz apparently assume that the exclusionary rule applies by default. This assumption is in
apparent tension with statements by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals suggesting that
district courts should perform a cost-benefit analysis of the costs of exclusion versus the
benefits of deterrence before applying the exclusionary rule in the first place. See United
States v. Wright, 493 F. App'x 265, 271 (3d Cir. 2012); Virgin Islands v. John, 654 F.3d
412, 417-18 (3d Cir. 2011).
1 2 Ortiz, 878 F. Supp. 2d at 541. At the time the agents acted in Ortiz, four courts of
appeals had specifically addressed the question of GPS installation. Id. at 538; see also supra
note 87.
ll 3 See Ortiz, 878 F. Supp. 2d at 541; see also Robinson, 903 F. Supp. 2d at 783-84
(rejecting the notion that Davis requires lower courts "to engage in a free-ranging balancing
test [of costs and benefits] in the absence of controlling Supreme Court or Circuit
authority").
2013] 823
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
exclusionary rule. Recall that to exclude evidence obtained by means of a
constitutional violation, a court must ultimately find that the deterrence benefits
of exclusion outweigh the costs of letting criminals go free.11 4 The court in
Ortiz held that in a case with nonbinding precedent only, the deterrence benefits
of exclusion outweigh the costs because exclusion deters police officers from
making guesses about the state of the law and how they should apply it. 115 In
the words of another district court, "suppression might deter the officer who
picks and chooses which law he wishes to follow."ll 6 At least on the facts in
Ortiz, in which application for a warrant "would not have impaired or delayed
the investigation in any way," the court held that the benefits of exclusion
outweighed the costs. 117 Another court's even more striking version of the cost-
benefit argument urges that a system in which officers review nonbinding
precedent and make their best guess about what practices are legal would "at
least border[] on being categorized as systemic negligence."" 8 Extending Davis
to nonbinding precedent, the court suggests, might actually encourage police
activity that the exclusionary rule exists to deter.
The final two arguments for restricting Davis to cases of binding precedent
appear only in passing in the lower court opinions. One suggests that allowing
police to rely on nonbinding precedent will stunt the development of Fourth
Amendment law in jurisdictions with unsettled law.119 In his Davis dissent,
Justice Breyer worried about the closely related problem of nonretroactivity:
under the majority decision, defendants will often find themselves with a right
to retroactive application of new law but with no remedy.120 As Professor Kerr
has argued, in such circumstances defendants lose the incentive to raise
suppression challenges, and courts will not hear arguments from parties most
interested in maintaining strong Fourth Amendment protections.121 A final
114 Supra note 41 and accompanying text.
115 Ortiz, 878 F. Supp. 2d at 541-42.
116 United States v. Lee, 862 F. Supp. 2d 560, 569 (E.D. Ky. 2012).
1 17 See Ortiz, 878 F. Supp. 2d at 541-42; see also United States v. Katzin, No. 11-226,
2012 WL 1646894, at *9 (E.D. Pa. May 9, 2012) (allowing police to rely on nonbinding
precedent "would encourage law enforcement to beg forgiveness rather than ask permission
in ambiguous situations involving the basic civil rights"). Notably, however, the Katzin court
gave particular consideration to the fact that disagreement existed among the circuits,
leaving open the possibility that the court might have applied the good-faith exception if
nonbinding precedent had unanimously authorized the GPS monitoring. Id.
I1 8 Katzin, 2012 WL 1646894, at *9. In dicta in the Herring decision, the Supreme
Court suggested that "systemic negligence" by law enforcement might defeat the application
of the good-faith exception. See Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 144 (2009); United
States v. Swearingen, No. CR 12-26-M-DLC, 2013 WL 174479, at *8 (D. Mont. Jan. 8,
2013) (denying the good-faith exception on grounds of "recurring and/or systemic
negligence" when police on two occasions unconstitutionally seized defendant's computer).
'
1 9 See United States v. Robinson, 903 F. Supp. 2d 766, 784 (E.D. Mo. 2012).
120 See supra note 73.
121 See Kerr, supra note 29, at 1092 ("Without an exclusionary rule for new law,
defendants will have no reason to ask courts to change the law to help them."). Professor
Kerr also contributed to Davis's briefs in the Supreme Court, and the arguments focused on
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argument raised in favor of restricting Davis to cases of binding precedent
points out the practicality of the interpretation. The narrow view creates a clear,
administrable rule for law enforcement officers: rely on decisions of the United
States Supreme Court, your own federal circuit court, or your state supreme
court. 122 Opening the door to nonbinding precedent admits a host of difficult
questions, such as how many courts of appeals have to authorize a practice,
whether district court decisions matter, and how to deal with disagreement
among persuasive opinions.123 Binding appellate precedent is a far clearer guide
for police officers than a rule allowing them to consider nonbinding precedent
as well.124
The narrow-view courts have uniformly suppressed evidence in cases
lacking binding appellate precedent. This fact reflects the common thread
running through these cases: a background assumption that the exclusionary
rule should apply by default when police officers acquire evidence in violation
of the Constitution.125 From this default rule, the good-faith exception simply
carves out particular circumstances-reliance on warrants, statutes, binding
precedents-where exclusion has no role to play. These courts are content to
leave it to the Supreme Court to extend the exception to new facts, such as to a
reliance on nonbinding precedent.
B. The Broad View: Nonbinding Precedent and Culpability Analysis
A number of lower courts have not felt so constrained by the language of
"binding appellate precedent" in Davis. Instead, these courts tend to treat the
rule as merely a specific application of a much broader principle of culpability.
One way to state that principle, in Davis's words, is that evidence should be
excluded only if police "exhibit deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent
the problem of retroactivity. See Brief for Petitioner at 7-9, Davis v. United States, 131
S. Ct. 2419 (2011) (No. 09-11328); Reply Brief for Petitioner at 3-7, Davis, 131 S. Ct. 2419
(No. 09-11328); see also Paul J. Mishkin, Foreword: The High Court, the Great Writ, and
the Due Process of Time and Law, 79 HARV. L. REv. 56, 60-61 (1965) (describing the
troubling incentives generated by remedies with purely prospective effect).
122 See United States v. Lee, 862 F. Supp. 2d 560, 570 (E.D. Ky. 2012). A relatively
unexplored issue in this area is the interplay between state and federal law. See, e.g.,
LAFAVE, supra note 23, § 1.3(h) (noting that "an equivalent basis for [good-faith] reliance at
both the federal and state level is not inevitable, meaning the Davis approach can produce
added mischief').
123 Lee, 862 F. Supp. 2d at 570; see also Katzin, 2012 WL 1646894, at *9. Justice
Breyer raised similar concerns in his Davis dissent with respect to the question of what
constitutes "binding precedent." See Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2437 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
12 4 See Lee, 862 F. Supp. 2d at 570.
125 The assumption does not always remain in the background: the court in Katzin
explicitly rejected the broad view of Davis because going "beyond the strict Davis holding
sharpens the instruments that can effectively eviscerate the exclusionary rule entirely."
Katzin, 2012 WL 1646894, at *9.
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disregard for Fourth Amendment rights."l 26 A different formulation, from the
next sentence in Davis, says that "when the police act with an objectively
reasonable good-faith belief that their conduct is lawful, or when their conduct
involves only simple, isolated negligence, the deterrence rationale loses much
of its force, and exclusion cannot pay its way."l 27
Appealing to one or both of these principles, a growing majority of lower
courts have developed arguments in favor of a broad interpretation of Davis that
encompasses consideration of nonbinding precedent. The central argument is
that Davis and the rest of the Leon line of cases justify their holdings with a
cost-benefit analysis that determines the deterrence benefits of exclusion by
analyzing police culpability. Because the Supreme Court has provided this test
for the good-faith exception, the lower courts should apply it to new fact
patterns as they arise rather than feeling bound by the strict holdings of the
Court's cases. Lower courts also argue that the narrow approach threatens to
inhibit the development of new police procedures.
Most of the broad-view courts have seen themselves as accepting the
obvious import of Davis.12 8 In United States v. Leon (not to be confused with
the Supreme Court case), for example, the district court recognized that no
binding appellate precedent supported the officers' actions and that "Davis
therefore is not directly controlling on this issue."129 Nonetheless, to establish
the effect of nonbinding precedent, the court immediately turned to the Davis
rationale for its test: "whether the agents exhibited 'deliberate, reckless, or
grossly negligent disregard for Fourth Amendment rights' or whether they acted
'with an objectively reasonable good-faith belief that their conduct [was]
lawful."'1 30 So even when Davis does not control, the court decided, its
culpability rationale should drive a lower court's analysis. In the words of
another district court, "the relevant inquiry is not whether the precedent upon
126Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2427 (internal quotation marks omitted).
127Id. at 2427-28 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). These
formulations are not two sides of a coin. Between objective reasonableness and gross
negligence lies ordinary negligence, a vast territory of potential police behavior that the
Supreme Court has scarcely dealt with in its good-faith exception cases. See Herring v.
United States, 555 U.S. 135, 137 (2009) (police negligence "attenuated" from the
constitutional violation does not bar the good-faith exception).
12 8 See United States v. Batista, No. 5:12cr1 1, 2013 WL 782710, at *6 (W.D. Va. Feb.
28, 2013); United States v. Fisher, Nos. 2:10-cr-28, 2:10-cr-32, 2013 WL 214379, at *2
(W.D. Mich. Jan. 18, 2013); United States v. Guyton, No. 11-271, 2013 WL 55837, at *5
(E.D. La. Jan. 3, 2013); United States v. Ford, No. 1:11-CR-42, 2012 WL 5366049, at *11
(E.D. Tenn. Oct. 30, 2012); United States v. Rose, 914 F. Supp. 2d 15, 24 (D. Mass. 2012);
United States v. Lopez, 895 F. Supp. 2d 592, 605 (D. Del. 2012); United States v. Baez, 878
F. Supp. 2d 288, 294 (D. Mass. 2012); United States v. Leon, 856 F. Supp. 2d 1188, 1193
(D. Haw. 2012).
129 Leon, 856 F. Supp. 2d at 1193.
130 Id. (quoting Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2427).
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which officers rely is legally binding but whether it was objectively reasonable
to rely on that precedent." 131
Once a court decides that it can consider nonbinding precedent in a
culpability analysis, it then faces the question of what kind of reliance deserves
good-faith protection. The district court in United States v. Baez adopted the
rule that when "law enforcement officers at the time they act have a good faith
basis to rely upon substantial consensus among precedential courts, suppression
of probative evidence is too high a price to pay" when that consensus is
overturned.132 In Baez, this "substantial consensus"1 33 consisted of three
decisions by circuit courts of appeals, all of which agreed that police did not
need a warrant to install GPS devices.134 This state of the law, offering no hint
that the practice might be unconstitutional, gave the officers in Baez no reason
to doubt the lawfulness of their action. Just three days before the officers in
Baez stopped using the GPS monitoring,135 the D.C. Circuit handed down
United States v. Maynard, which broke the circuit unanimity by requiring
warrants for GPS installation and tracking.136 According to Baez, the Maynard
decision created a distinguishable set of circumstances thereafter. Baez
distinguished Katzin-another district court in the First Circuit that had earlier
adopted the narrow view of Davis and denied the good-faith exceptionl 37-by
pointing to the fact that the officers in Katzin installed a GPS device after the
Maynard decision created a circuit split.138 Thus, while the Baez officers had no
reason to think warrantless GPS devices might be illegal, the Katzin officers did
have reason because of the circuit split.139
131 Guyton, 2013 WL 55837, at *5. The difference between binding and nonbinding
precedent becomes relatively unimportant under this reasonableness analysis. In Guyton, for
example, the court held that police could have reasonably relied on a case in their circuit
with loosely similar facts, and that this was so whether or not the court could find that the
precedent was in fact controlling. Id. at *8.
132 Baez, 878 F. Supp. 2d at 289.
133 Another district court has offered a similar standard, holding that the good-faith
exception applies in cases of "objectively reasonable reliance on a comprehensive body of
case law," whether or not that case law is binding. Rose, 914 F. Supp. 2d at 22 (emphasis
added).
134 See United States v. Marquez, 605 F.3d 604, 609-10 (8th Cir. 2010); United States v.
Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212, 1216-17 (9th Cir. 2010); United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d
994, 998 (7th Cir. 2007); United States v. Michael, 645 F.2d 252, 257 (5th Cir. 1981)
(holding that reasonable suspicion may support the warrantless installation of an electronic
tracking "beeper").
135 Baez, 878 F. Supp. 2d at 293.
136 United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 560 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
137 See supra note 117.
138 See Baez, 878 F. Supp. 2d at 296.
139 The district court in United States v. Oladosu took a very similar approach, finding
good faith on the basis of unanimous circuit court holdings, and distinguishing its result
from several narrow-view decisions on the ground that the police actions in those cases
occurred after the development of the circuit split. United States v. Oladosu, 887 F. Supp. 2d
437, 447-48 (D.R.I. 2012). The court even granted some significance to the fact that, in a
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In addition to arguing that the narrow, binding-precedent-only view of
Davis ignores the Supreme Court's rationale, broad-view courts have stressed
the possibility that a narrow view would over-deter law enforcement. The court
in United States v. Rosel40 makes such a point concisely. If officers may not
rely on nonbinding precedent, "police in some jurisdictions would be forced to
wait decades to implement new technology or risk suppression even
where ... the warrantless use of the technology was universally considered to
be constitutionally permissible."'41 The alternative for law enforcement,
seeking a warrant, "seems unnecessarily unwieldy-and potentially ennervating
to timely police action."142
C. Where the Current Case Law Stands
Without a doubt, the broad-view courts have the wind at their backs with
respect to current Supreme Court precedent on the good-faith exception.143
Whereas the narrow-view courts are struggling to find a way around the
increasingly broad rationales of cases such as Herring and Davis, broad-view
courts accept this rationale as the applicable law and concern themselves mainly
with finding the right test to apply to nonbinding precedent. Other themes also
emerge from the lower-court cases. First, and most notably, the lower courts are
experimenting with a fairly broad range of responses to Davis. Although the
majority of courts have accepted the broad view and extended the exception
into new fact patterns, at least a handful of courts are finding that the Court has
not yet demanded or even authorized such an extension.
Also intriguing is the fact that in every case, a lower court's decision to read
Davis narrowly or broadly correlates with suppression or admission,
Ninth Circuit dissent from denial of rehearing en banc soon after Maynard, Judge Kozinski
vigorously disputed the constitutionality of GPS installations. Id. at 446-47 (citing Pineda-
Moreno, 617 F.3d at 1123 (Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc)). One
is inclined to wonder how a legal nuance such as the persuasive effect of a five-person
dissent from a denial of rehearing en banc can be said to have put an objectively reasonable
officer "on notice" that she needed a warrant. See id. It is one thing to assume an objectively
reasonable officer is aware of nonbinding circuit court decisions. See, e.g., United States v.
Lopez, 895 F. Supp. 2d 592, 606-07 (D. Del. 2012) (finding an officer's installation of a
GPS device objectively reasonable on the grounds of nonbinding circuit decisions, despite
the officer's failure to seek prior legal advice). It is quite another to assume the officer
knows of dissenting opinions of any kind.
140 914 F. Supp. 2d 15, 23 (D. Mass. 2012).
141 Id. Police could restrict the use of such technologies to situations in which they can
acquire a warrant, in which case (assuming a facially valid warrant) Leon itself would grant
the good-faith exception. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 913 (1984). Of course, this
restriction would seriously limit the value of a technology such as GPS early in
investigations.
142 See Baez, 878 F. Supp. 2d at 297.
143 See supra note 20 (listing articles that argue Davis significantly curtails the
exclusionary rule).
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respectively. What this uniformity means is not immediately clear. In the
context of cases in which no binding appellate precedent existed, the narrow
reading almost certainly disposes of the cases as falling outside the limits of the
good-faith exception. But the "objectively reasonable" or "not grossly
negligent" analyses of the broad-view courts should not obviously lead to
application of the exception in every case. At least some of the broad-view
cases involve searches that took place after the circuit split developed over
warrantless GPS.144 It is too soon to conclude on this narrow range of cases
that, as some commentators have suggested, a broad reading of Davis
effectively guts the exclusionary rule. 145 But the evidence from these cases does
demonstrate that courts inclined to the broad view have a number of options for
finding police action reasonable when there was no binding law authorizing the
action. Some examples: on-point but nonbinding precedent from one or more
circuits; 146 precedents binding in one's own jurisdiction that are analogous but
not directly on point;147 and a simple lack of legal authority calling the action
into question. 148
IV. SOLUTION: RELIANCE ON "CLEARLY ESTABLISHED" LAW
At least two related but distinct questions emerge from the problem
presented above. First, how should lower courts interpret Davis? The courts
disagree on the scope of Davis and also, to some extent, on the role lower courts
should play in developing questions left unanswered by the Supreme Court.
Should the courts limit themselves to a fact-bound reading of the case, or should
they embrace and apply the broad principles that justify the Supreme Court's
decision? Much of the district courts' disagreement revolves around these
144 E.g., United States v. Ford, No. 1:11 -CR-42, 2012 WL 5366049, at *11 (E.D. Tenn.
Oct. 30, 2012); Rose, 914 F. Supp. 2d at 23. In Rose, officers installed one of four GPS
devices after the D.C. Circuit's Maynard decision created the circuit split. Id. Rose
attempted to downplay the relevance of Maynard by noting that another district court case,
United States v. Sparks, 750 F. Supp. 2d 384, 392, 395 (D. Mass. 2010), had criticized the
outcome in Maynard. Rose, 914 F. Supp. 2d at 23.
145 E.g., Maclin & Rader, supra note 20, at 1189.
146E.g., Ford, 2012 WL 5366049, at *10 (relying on precedents in the Seventh, Eighth,
and Ninth Circuits).
147 E.g., United States v. Leon, 856 F. Supp. 2d 1188, 1193-94 (D. Haw. 2012)
("Although the technology changed, the agents were certainly justified in relying on Knotts'
rationale in determining that no warrant was required."); Kelly v. State, 56 A.3d 523, 541
(Md. App. 2012) (holding that Davis does not require "that there be a prior appellate case
directly on point, i.e., factually the same as the police conduct in question").
148 This appears to be the rationale in People v. Hill, 829 N.W.2d 908, 915 (Mich. Ct.
App. 2013) (granting good-faith exception to police officers who entered defendant's home
on a neighbor's tip that he might need help). A variation on the theme finds that the search
effectively took place in another jurisdiction and applies that jurisdiction's law as the
binding precedent. See United States v. Shelburne, 3:11-cr-156-S, 2012 WL 2344457, at
*4-5 (W.D. Ky. June 20, 2012) (district court in the Sixth Circuit looked to Seventh Circuit
precedent because the investigation had originated there).
2013] 829
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
questions, which are fundamentally issues of stare decisiS.149 Second, assuming
the validity of both approaches, which presents the better solution to the
problem? Attempting to answer this question is not necessarily a wasted
exercise. As the disagreement among lower courts suggests, Davis has left the
Supreme Court room to maneuver in future cases.
A. Clearing the Underbrush: Preliminary Issues of Stare Decisis
Both the narrow and broad interpretations of Davis can claim support from
existing theories of stare decisis. On a restrictive theory of precedent that
focuses solely on facts and outcome rather than on the Court's explicit
rationale, 50 one can read the holding of Davis as limited to cases of binding
appellate precedent. 151 The Court in Davis repeatedly refers to the existence of
binding appellate precedent as a fact critical to its decision, and such "material
facts" establish the breadth of the holding.152 On the other hand, following a
more rationale-based theory of precedent,153 a lower court could reasonably
accept Davis's rationale regarding "deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent
disregard for Fourth Amendment rights" 54 to bind the lower court to consider
whether police culpability rises to this level. While a lower court might
plausibly choose either course, the wide gulf between the Supreme Court's
factual holdings and the logical consequences of its rationale argues in favor of
the narrower, holding-based approach.
The Supreme Court's good-faith holdings, including Davis, establish a
fairly uncontroversial rule on the narrower reading: when police are relying in
good faith on what they reasonably take to be an authoritative statement of their
149 See Evan H. Caminker, Precedent and Prediction: The Forward-Looking Aspects of
Inferior Court Decisionmaking, 73 TEx. L. REv. 1, 4-6 (1994).
150 For the classic exposition of this view, see Arthur L. Goodhart, Determining the
Ratio Decidendi of a Case, 40 YALE L.J. 161, 162 (1930). In Goodhart's view, the "task in
analyzing a case is not to state the facts and the conclusion, but to state the material facts as
seen by the judge and his conclusion based on them." Id. at 169. Determining which facts
are material to the judge's decision allows one to determine the breadth of the holding. See
id. at 174-75.
151 This view might even understand the holding to cover a police officer's cooperation
with any binding law, because the Court compares binding appellate precedent to the
existence of a warrant or statute. See Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2429 (2011).
152 See supra note 97. Instead of focusing on binding appellate precedent, the Court
could have formulated a broader rule by basing its holding on the existence of any
persuasive precedent that reasonably justifies police behavior. See Goodhart, supra note 150,
at 169 ("To ignore [the Court's] choice is to miss the whole point of the case.").
153 E.g., Michael C. Dorf, Dicta and Article III, 142 U. PA. L. REv. 1997, 2040 (1994)
("In sum, a commitment to the rule of law and a proper understanding of the source of
legitimate authority in our constitutional order will result in a holding/dictum distinction that
turns on rationales, not just facts and outcomes.").154 Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2427 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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legal duties, the inaccuracy of that statement does not require exclusion.155 So
when a legislature or a magistrate makes a mistake about the law, the police are
still right to act on that authority until a court corrects it. "Punishing" officers
with exclusion of evidence obtained in such a way cannot deter them from
future Fourth Amendment violations. But when the mistake of law lies with the
officer and not a legislature or magistrate, the deterrence picture looks quite
different. Take for instance a police officer who, having received a tip from a
citizen, mistakenly believes himself justified in entering a home without a
warrant in order to check on the welfare of an occupant. 156 Under a pure
culpability analysis, this mistake looks like the kind of "simple, isolated
negligence" that Davis says does not warrant exclusion.157 And yet such
negligence occurs every day, meaning a broad interpretation of the Davis
holding would affect a wide array of cases, strongly tilting the balance of the
Fourth Amendment away from privacy protection toward aggressive law
enforcement.
Setting aside the policy question of whether the exclusionary rule ought to
stand or fall, lower courts should not take it upon themselves to extend the
good-faith exception to cases of police negligence. For lower courts to make so
sweeping a change to the law on the basis of Supreme Court cases decided on
very different facts raises the possibility that an overly broad rule will not
adequately anticipate new fact scenarios. 158 The more sensible course for a
lower court, particularly where a constitutional protection is at stake, is to allow
the Court to, as it were, put its ruling where its rationale is. When the right case
comes along, the Supreme Court can clarify whether everyday police
negligence really deserves the benefit of the good-faith exception. 159 In the
meantime, by adopting the approach described below, lower courts could
155 Professor LaFave acknowledges that Davis looks at first glance like a "no brainer,"
but he argues that the case departs significantly from the rest of the Leon line by assuming
an officer's "reasonable reliance" on case law rather than requiring an actual showing of
reliance. LAFAVE, supra note 23, § 1.3(h).
156 These facts come, slightly modified, from People v. Hill, 829 N.W.2d 908, 912
(Mich. Ct. App. 2013). In Hill, the court avoided the constitutional question of whether a
Fourth Amendment violation had occurred, holding instead that the good-faith exception
would apply because "the record establishes that the police officers acted with an objectively
reasonable good-faith belief that their conduct was lawful." Id. at 915.157 Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2427-28 (internal quotation marks omitted).
158 Of course, sweeping changes to the law become scarcer if lower courts have to wait
for the Supreme Court to hear enough cases to drive home a broad principle. After Brown v.
Board of Education, for example, lower courts extended the Supreme Court's school-
desegregation decisions to other public facilities, despite the existence of prior Supreme
Court precedent upholding segregation in such institutions. Ashutosh Bhagwat, Separate but
Equal?: The Supreme Court, the Lower Federal Courts, and the Nature of the "Judicial
Power, " 80 B.U. L. REV. 967, 976 (2000). One might make a distinction between extending
liberties in the desegregation context and curtailing them in the case of Fourth Amendment
violations.
159 For a discussion of the virtues of "judicial minimalism," see CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE
CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT 259-63 (1999).
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continue to apply the exclusionary rule while faithfully following Supreme
Court precedent on the good-faith exception.
B. The Proposed "Clearly Established" Standard
Each of the views outlined above, narrow and broad, offers a key insight.
The narrow view recognizes that the good-faith exception applies most
appropriately when officers are following clear legal authority that, through no
fault of their own, turns out to have been mistaken. The broad view recognizes
that Davis stands for more than the proposition that reliance on binding
precedent should receive the benefit of the good-faith exception. The solution
suggested here incorporates both of these insights in an effort to accommodate
the primary, competing policy concerns of the Fourth Amendment: personal
privacy and effective law enforcement. While society wants to encourage police
officers to use effective new investigative techniques, it does not want to do so
in such a way that officers are constantly invading individual privacy rights.
The nonbinding-precedent situation presents the question of what the state
of the law must be in order for an officer to act without culpability. Courts have
been answering this question for many years in the context of § 1983160 actions
and the application of qualified immunity. Qualified immunity provides a useful
comparison to the good-faith exception because many of the same
considerations are involved.161 In essence, the doctrine of qualified immunity
shields government officials from suits seeking civil damages when "their
conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of
which a reasonable person would have known."l 62 Courts should look to that
doctrine for assistance in applying the good-faith exception to cases involving a
lack of binding precedent.163
The analysis courts should consider adopting is as follows. When police
lack binding legal authority for an action that turns out to violate the Fourth
Amendment-i.e., no warrant, statute, or binding appellate precedent authorized
16042 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) (originally part of the Civil Rights Act of 1871).
161 Professor Laurin has carefully and convincingly traced the role qualified immunity
doctrine has played in the development of the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule.
See generally Laurin, supra note 28. Her account suggests that this doctrinal borrowing has
mainly resulted in the constriction of the exclusionary rule. Id. at 744. The method suggested
here openly borrows from qualified immunity doctrine, but in such a way as to require
greater police attention to legal authority than the qualified immunity doctrine itself does.
162 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
163 Commentators have recognized the potential for overlap between the two doctrines.
See Orin Kerr, Supreme Court Expands Good-Faith Exception to Exclusionary Rule To
Include Reliance on Overturned Law, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (June 16, 2011, 10:41 AM),
http://www.volokh.com/2011/06/16/court-expands-good-faith-exception-to-reliance-on-
overturned-law/ ("Whether Davis applies when the law is merely unclear is the obvious next
question: The significant possibility (always in the background during Davis) is that the
Court may limit the exclusionary rule to the same types of rare cases in which there is no
qualified immunity."). *
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the actionl 64-courts should ask whether the constitutionality of the police
action was clearly established when the police acted. Only when the
constitutionality of the action was clearly established should the good-faith
exception apply.
Note first that this approach modifies the object of the qualified immunity
inquiry. That inquiry asks in effect whether the unconstitutionality of the police
action was clearly established. If the law gave an officer notice that her action
would violate a citizen's clearly established constitutional rights, she is not
entitled to qualified immunity for acting. In cases of uncertainty, however,
where the right was not clearly established and the officer's action might have
been constitutional, her actions receive immunity.
By contrast, the analysis suggested for the good-faith exception asks a
different question: whether the law has clearly established the constitutionality
of a particular police practice. Another way to ask the question is whether the
law has clearly established a citizen's lack of a constitutional right under certain
circumstances. If the law puts the reasonable officer on notice that her action
might be unconstitutional, she should refrain. Reasonable uncertainty in this
analysis will not provide the officer with good-faith protection, and suppression
of illegally obtained evidence will result. This standard keeps the good-faith
exception tethered to an officer's compliance with clear legal authority, but it
does so in a way that allows law enforcement to adopt new investigative
techniques without unreasonable delay.
With respect to nonbinding precedent, this makes the suggested analysis a
version of the broad-view approach described above, though it is consistent
with the fundamental concerns of many narrow-view courts. In keeping with
qualified immunity doctrine, the suggested analysis would allow courts to
consider at least some nonbinding precedent 65 as well as binding precedents
not directly on point. 166
1. The Standard in Action: Application to the GPS Cases
The GPS cases offer a ready test for the application of the proposed
standard. A first case demonstrates that the clearly-established standard grows
directly out of the Davis holding and the Court's line of good-faith cases
beginning with Leon. In this hypothetical, police in the Ninth Circuit install a
GPS device without a warrant. At the time of the installation, police can rely on
164 This describes the situation in which none of the existing good-faith exceptions
applies, including the GPS cases explored in Part 111.
165 See Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2084 (2011) (requiring "a robust consensus
of cases of persuasive authority" to clearly establish constitutional rights (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
166 Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002) ("[O]fficials can still be on notice that their
conduct violates established law even in novel factual circumstances. Indeed, in [United
States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 268 (1997)], we expressly rejected a requirement that
previous cases be 'fundamentally similar."').
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a case in their circuit that holds warrantless GPS installations constitutional.167
Jones subsequently overrules the Ninth Circuit case, making the police
installation retrospectively unconstitutional. Because the Ninth Circuit's
binding appellate precedent authorized the installation, Davis controls and the
good-faith exception applies, preventing the exclusionary rule from barring
evidence. Another way of phrasing the result is to say that binding appellate
precedent clearly established the constitutionality of employing GPS tracking,
so that a police officer in the Ninth Circuit has strong legal authority to install
the GPS device. The clearly-established standard thus offers a generalized
formulation of the Davis holding and indeed of the whole Leon line.168
While the example above establishes that the proposed standard harmonizes
with Davis, it does not yet address the issue of what nonbinding precedent will
suffice to support the application of the good-faith exception. The easiest
hypothetical case would involve unanimous affirmation of warrantless GPS
installations by all circuit courts, except the one in which the installation takes
place. Despite the lack of binding appellate precedent, the constitutionality of
warrantless GPS use in this example has so much support that an officer could
not reasonably believe that a warrantless GPS installation violates the
Constitution. 169 Here the qualified immunity and good-faith analyses would
both cover an officer: the reasonable police officer not only could believe that
the action was constitutional (granting qualified immunity), but he would have
no reason to doubt it (granting the good-faith exception).
Even when fewer circuits have weighed in on an issue, unanimity should
carry decisive weight. When even a few federal circuit courts have authorized a
practice and no precedential court disagrees, a reasonable police officer would
have no reason to believe the practice violates the Fourth Amendment. The
Court's qualified immunity doctrine offers guidance here, establishing that "a
robust consensus of cases of persuasive authority" meets the standard. 170
Conflict between courts, however, produces very different consequences in
the good-faith analysis than in the qualified immunity analysis. The Court has
said that when circuit courts disagree on the constitutionality of an action, a
police officer may reasonably still believe the action is constitutional and
167 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held in 1999 that the warrantless installation of a
GPS device on a vehicle parked in a driveway is not a search. United States v. McIver, 186
F.3d 1119, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 1999).
168 As argued above, the good-faith cases establish a rule that exclusion is inappropriate
when officers are acting on legal authority that turns out to be invalid through no fault of
their own. Herring's exception for attenuated negligence by police clerks is perhaps best
understood as a de minimis exception to this rule. See Herring v. United States, 555 U.S.
135, 137 (2009).
1691mprobable though these facts may be, they helpfully emphasize the excessive
formalism at the root of the narrow view of Davis. Facing such unanimous agreement that a
police action is constitutional, an officer in the lone undecided circuit would have no reason
to suppose that his circuit would disagree with such a considerable body of persuasive
precedent. In other words, there could be little deterrent value to suppression in such a case.
170 Ashcroft, 131 S. Ct. at 2084.
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receive qualified immunity protection.171 For qualified immunity purposes, in
other words, doubt favors the officer. But in the suggested analysis for the
good-faith exception, doubt would favor the defendant's Fourth Amendment
rights.172 When nonbinding courts disagree, the officer can no longer say the
constitutionality of his action is clearly established. 173 In such a case, the officer
should refrain from acting or face the suppression of any evidence he obtains
through the potential violation. 174 In many of the lower-court GPS cases, both
broad and narrow, this test for the good-faith exception would reach the same
result the courts reached. 175
Some practical complications would arise of course. For one thing, not
every relevant nonbinding precedent will equally speak to the facts of a case at
hand. In Baez, for example, police tracked the defendant's car for nearly a
year,176 whereas in Katzin the monitoring lasted just a few days. 177 Although
these factual distinctions played little role in the courts' analyses, one can
imagine these differences becoming important if, for example, three nonbinding
circuit courts of appeals had authorized warrantless GPS installations for less
than a month. Whether a reasonable police officer could doubt that a year-long
installation was permissible in these circumstances does not find an easy
answer. Again, the Court's qualified immunity jurisprudence may provide some
171 Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 618 (1999).172 This result does not run counter to the Court's view that in the context of applying
for a warrant that turns out to be invalid, the standard for applying qualified immunity
should be the same as that for applying the good-faith exception. See Malley v. Briggs, 475
U.S. 335, 344 (1986). There the Court is referring to the application of the good-faith
exception when a judge issues a warrant, not when an officer is attempting on her own to
determine the weight and relevance of conflicting court decisions. Id.
173 According to this view, those district courts granting the good-faith exception to
searches conducted after the D.C. Circuit's Maynard decision and before Jones would be in
error. See, e.g., United States v. Batista, No. 5:12crl1, 2013 WL 782710, at *7 (W.D. Va.
Feb. 28, 2013) (granting good-faith exception to officers who acted in the face of a circuit
split).
174 One can imagine an endless variety of scenarios of courts agreeing and disagreeing
with one another on the constitutionality of an action. Determining precisely which scenarios
should lead to a finding that the law was clearly established is beyond the scope of this Note.
Through their qualified immunity and good-faith exception cases, the courts will continue to
work through these scenarios over time.
175 See United States v. Oladosu, 887 F. Supp. 2d 437, 448 (D.R.I. 2012); United States
v. Baez, 878 F. Supp. 2d 288, 294 (D. Mass. 2012); United States v. Ortiz, 878 F. Supp. 2d
515, 543 (E.D. Pa. 2012); United States v. Lujan, No. 2:1lCRll-SA, 2012 WL 2861546, at
*3 (N.D. Miss. July 11, 2012); United States v. Lee, 862 F. Supp. 2d 560, 571 (E.D. Ky.
2012); United States v. Katzin, No. 11-226, 2012 WL 1646894, at *1 (E.D. Pa. May 9,
2012); United States v. Leon, 856 F. Supp. 2d 1188, 1193 (D. Haw. 2012). Oladosu noted
and even plotted out this timeline based on the "legal landscape at the time of the Fourth
Amendment violation." Oladosu, 887 F. Supp. 2d at 447. The proposed standard differs
from Oladosu's approach mainly in its manner of surveying this legal landscape.
176 Baez, 878 F. Supp. 2d at 292 (347 days).
177 Katzin, 2012 WL 1646894, at *2.
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guidance, but on this question the Court has not provided entirely consistent
answers. 178
2. Policy Considerations Supporting the "Clearly Established" Standard
Several considerations support the adoption of such a standard. (1) The
standard is consistent with existing Supreme Court precedent on the good-faith
exception; (2) it would help to prevent the constitutional violations that raise
exclusionary rule problems; (3) it provides a readily administrable standard that
courts and police officers are already familiar with on precisely these issues;
and, (4) it allows police across the country to adopt new investigative
techniques without having to wait for test cases in their jurisdictions.
First, a "clearly established" standard fits within the Supreme Court's
existing precedent. The central theme running through the Leon line of cases is
that exclusion is not appropriate when police are following the law. Each case
involves police officers doing exactly what they had good reason to believe was
lawful.179 Allowing police officers to rely on clearly established law represents
a modest extension of the existing principle of the good-faith exception. It
extends the principle by permitting officers to rely not only on the law of their
own jurisdiction, but also on that of other jurisdictions. It does so modestly
because it requires strong evidence that the prospective action is lawful.
Second, the simplicity of the clearly-established standard makes it relatively
easy for police officers to avoid violations. Because the heavy costs of
exclusion arise only when police violate the Fourth Amendment, a standard that
helps officers avoid violations will reduce those costs. The standard provides
clarity for law enforcement officers by requiring them (or, more likely, their
supervisors) to keep track of a limited range of nonbinding case law, and the
objective standard encourages supervisors to provide adequate training. When
in doubt, officers should err on the side of inaction. The trade-off to caution, of
course, is less vigorous police action. In the GPS cases, applying the clearly-
established standard would likely have led to policies requiring a warrant for the
use of GPS tracking. Securing warrants could slow down some police
investigations or even render certain technologies infeasible. Some answers to
this problem present themselves. For one thing, warrant requirements grow less
178 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 580 (6th ed. 2012) ("[T]here is great
confusion in the lower courts as to whether and when cases on point are needed to overcome
qualified immunity.").
179 Herring provides a slight wrinkle because police negligence played a role in bringing
about the constitutional violation. See supra Part II.C. In Herring, police officials in one
district negligently failed to update a warrant database, which led to a warrantless arrest.
Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 137-38 (2009). However, the arresting officer who
relied on the faulty information from the database had no reason to doubt its accuracy, so he
was following clearly established law. Id. at 137.
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burdensome with improvements in communication technologies.180 In addition,
caution makes particular sense in cases of new technology, where the full
implications of privacy invasions may not be immediately evident.18'
Third, both courts and police officers could readily apply this standard in
the good-faith context because they already do so in qualified immunity cases.
As indicated above, the standard applies with some modifications in the good-
faith context. The approach recommended here would discourage an officer
from acting unless the law clearly permits an action, whereas with qualified
immunity the officer may act when the action is not clearly prohibited. This
means in effect that qualified immunity would shield more police behavior than
the good-faith exception. The justification for this difference is that deterrence
plays a different role in the contexts of qualified immunity and exclusion.182
The possibility of personal liability primarily deters individual police officers
from taking unreasonable action,183 and fairness to officers drives much of the
qualified immunity doctrine.184 The possibility of evidence suppression will
deter some individual officers, but it will also deter law enforcement agencies
from ineffective officer training and from investigative policies and procedures
based on guesses as to what the law is.
Fourth, if the "clearly established" approach does not encourage police
departments to adopt new investigative techniques, it does at least permit the
adoption once a practice has gained sufficient judicial support. Law
enforcement agencies need to be able to adopt appropriate new technologies and
techniques as they become available. At the same time, appropriateness is not
always obvious and some check on the use of invasive new technologies is
desirable. With the approach recommended here, early adopters of a new
technology will take the risk that investigations relying on the technology may
fall apart if a court finds their actions unlawful. However, once courts have
180 See Donald L. Beci, Fidelity to the Warrant Clause: Using Magistrates, Incentives,
and Telecommunications Technology To Reinvigorate Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 73
DENV. U. L. REv. 293, 295 (1996) (noting, more than fifteen years ago, that "with current
computer and electronic telecommunications technology, police officers can now swiftly
obtain a warrant without leaving the area of investigation").
181 Although police often use GPS simply to place suspects at the scene of a crime, see,
e.g., Katzin, 2012 WL 1646894, at *2, Justice Sotomayor in her Jones concurrence described
the depth of personal detail police might glean from GPS data. United States v. Jones, 132
S. Ct. 945, 955 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) ("GPS monitoring generates a precise,
comprehensive record of a person's public movements that reflects a wealth of detail about
her familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual associations.").
182 See Laurin, supra note 28, at 738.
183 Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 70 (2001) ("The purpose of Bivens is to
deter individual federal officers from committing constitutional violations.").
184 E.g., Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 618 (1999) ("If judges thus disagree on a
constitutional question, it is unfair to subject police to money damages for picking the losing
side of the controversy.").
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upheld the validity of a practice, law enforcement across the country can then
rely on the technology at least with respect to current investigations. 8 5
3. Rethinking the Object ofDeterrence
One objection to the proposed approach will be that it does not fully
embrace the good-faith rationale that the Court has espoused in recent cases.
The Court has insisted that the lack of police culpability is the strongest thread
running through the Leon cases. Although a "clearly established" standard is
consistent with the Court's good-faith cases, it does not necessarily permit all
the police action that a pure culpability analysis would permit. For instance,
before any circuit courts had addressed the legality of warrantless GPS
installations and the law was not "clearly established," what were law
enforcement officials to do? Under the "clearly established" standard, they
would have lacked legal authority and would therefore have risked exclusion of
evidence obtained as a result of the use of GPS. The Court's culpability analysis
would at least potentially authorize the use of the technology in the face of
unsettled law, as it might assume, as Justice Breyer does, that acting in the face
of unsettled law is not culpable behavior. 186 As Justice Sotomayor points out,
however, culpability takes a backseat to deterrence in the Court's analysis of
whether exclusion should apply.'8 7 Culpability matters only because it indicates
whether there is anything to deter. Cases may arise, however, in which an
officer acts without culpability but deterrence would still make sense. A well-
meaning but badly trained officer could violate Fourth Amendment rights
without any personal culpability at all. The officer himself could not be deterred
from making bad choices, but a law enforcement agency that frequently botches
cases could be encouraged to improve its officer training.188 Deterrence, in
185 Until the Supreme Court has authorized a technology, of course, the possibility
always remains that its use will be struck down or limited in future investigations.
186 Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2439 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
I87 See id. at 2435 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
188 See William C. Heffernan & Richard W. Lovely, Evaluating the Fourth Amendment
Exclusionary Rule: The Problem of Police Compliance with the Law, 24 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 311, 368 (1991) ("Establishment of a 'good faith' exception would reduce the
incentive for departments to offer, and for officers to undertake, extensive training in the
law."); Laurin, supra note 28, at 738 ("[A]t the level of police management there are greater
political and bureaucratic incentives, and likely greater information, to ensure that searches
and arrests bear fruit in ultimate case dispositions."); Nolasco et al., supra note 53, at 249
("The deterrent value of the exclusionary rule in these cases is hardly minimal and its
application would likely encourage better police practices and departmental policies in the
same law enforcement agency."); Christopher Totten & Sutham Cobkit (Cheurprakobkit),
The Knock-and-Announce Rule and Police Searches After Hudson v. Michigan: Can
Alternative Deterrents Effectively Replace Exclusion for Rule Violations?, 15 NEW CRIM. L.
REv. 414, 453 (2012) ("[T]he majority of police chiefs (64.6%) of major U.S. cities in this
survey perceived that the exclusion of evidence is helpful in deterring police misconduct
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other words, can still play a role in preventing non-culpable but unconstitutional
behavior.
V. CONCLUSION
The Fourth Amendment's ban on unreasonable searches and seizures seeks
to balance privacy rights with vigorous law enforcement, and the exclusion of
illegally obtained evidence plays an uncertain role in maintaining that balance.
In the Court's current jurisprudence, exclusion may be justified only by its
capacity to deter police officers from future violations. So when police rely on a
legal authority that subsequently turns out to have been invalid, their good-faith
behavior renders deterrence, and hence exclusion, inappropriate.
Although Davis certainly extended the good-faith exception to reliance on
binding judicial precedent, lower courts have disagreed on the applicability of
the exception when police act on unsettled law. Two general approaches to the
question are currently playing out in the lower courts in GPS cases arising from
United States v. Jones, which held that warrantless GPS installation is a search
under the Fourth Amendment. On one side are courts that read Davis as a
narrow extension of the good-faith exception to reliance on binding precedent.
On the other are courts that read Davis as a broad extension of the exception to
cover all cases in which police are not grossly negligent, reckless, or
deliberately in violation of the law. Which side ultimately prevails will have a
significant impact on a defendant's motivation and ability to challenge Fourth
Amendment violations.
This Note proposes a test that both hews to the core of the Leon line of
good-faith cases and also allows police to adopt new technologies. The "clearly
established" standard provides a readily administrable principle for courts and
law enforcement to apply-they are already doing so in qualified immunity
cases-but it also fits within existing Supreme Court precedent while providing
protection for Fourth Amendment rights. Such a rule justifies the costs of
exclusion by deterring police from taking actions that threaten the privacy
protections of the Fourth Amendment.
related to the knock-and-announce rule (albeit somewhat less so than training, education,
and discipline).").
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